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[xen-unstable] x86/PoD: prevent guest from being destroyed upon early access to its memory

 

 

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patchbot at xen

Aug 16, 2012, 9:55 AM

Post #1 of 1 (92 views)
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[xen-unstable] x86/PoD: prevent guest from being destroyed upon early access to its memory

# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich [at] suse>
# Date 1345104851 -7200
# Node ID be8ae5439a884a48f1287989232e379c5985cf00
# Parent 6d56e31fe1e1dc793379d662a36ff1731760eb0c
x86/PoD: prevent guest from being destroyed upon early access to its memory

When an external agent (e.g. a monitoring daemon) happens to access the
memory of a PoD guest prior to setting the PoD target, that access must
fail for there not being any page in the PoD cache, and only the space
above the low 2Mb gets scanned for victim pages (while only the low 2Mb
got real pages populated so far).

To accomodate for this
- set the PoD target first
- do all physmap population in PoD mode (i.e. not just large [2Mb or
1Gb] pages)
- slightly lift the restrictions enforced by p2m_pod_set_mem_target()
to accomodate for the changed tools behavior

Tested-by: Jürgen Groß <juergen.gross [at] ts>
(in a 4.0.x based incarnation)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich [at] suse>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap [at] eu>
---


diff -r 6d56e31fe1e1 -r be8ae5439a88 tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c Wed Aug 15 09:41:21 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c Thu Aug 16 10:14:11 2012 +0200
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
int pod_mode = 0;

if ( nr_pages > target_pages )
- pod_mode = 1;
+ pod_mode = XENMEMF_populate_on_demand;

memset(&elf, 0, sizeof(elf));
if ( elf_init(&elf, image, image_size) != 0 )
@@ -197,6 +197,22 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
for ( i = mmio_start >> PAGE_SHIFT; i < nr_pages; i++ )
page_array[i] += mmio_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;

+ if ( pod_mode )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Subtract 0x20 from target_pages for the VGA "hole". Xen will
+ * adjust the PoD cache size so that domain tot_pages will be
+ * target_pages - 0x20 after this call.
+ */
+ rc = xc_domain_set_pod_target(xch, dom, target_pages - 0x20,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if ( rc != 0 )
+ {
+ PERROR("Could not set PoD target for HVM guest.\n");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Allocate memory for HVM guest, skipping VGA hole 0xA0000-0xC0000.
*
@@ -208,7 +224,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
* ensure that we can be preempted and hence dom0 remains responsive.
*/
rc = xc_domain_populate_physmap_exact(
- xch, dom, 0xa0, 0, 0, &page_array[0x00]);
+ xch, dom, 0xa0, 0, pod_mode, &page_array[0x00]);
cur_pages = 0xc0;
stat_normal_pages = 0xc0;
while ( (rc == 0) && (nr_pages > cur_pages) )
@@ -247,8 +263,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
sp_extents[i] = page_array[cur_pages+(i<<SUPERPAGE_1GB_SHIFT)];

done = xc_domain_populate_physmap(xch, dom, nr_extents, SUPERPAGE_1GB_SHIFT,
- pod_mode ? XENMEMF_populate_on_demand : 0,
- sp_extents);
+ pod_mode, sp_extents);

if ( done > 0 )
{
@@ -285,8 +300,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
sp_extents[i] = page_array[cur_pages+(i<<SUPERPAGE_2MB_SHIFT)];

done = xc_domain_populate_physmap(xch, dom, nr_extents, SUPERPAGE_2MB_SHIFT,
- pod_mode ? XENMEMF_populate_on_demand : 0,
- sp_extents);
+ pod_mode, sp_extents);

if ( done > 0 )
{
@@ -302,19 +316,12 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
if ( count != 0 )
{
rc = xc_domain_populate_physmap_exact(
- xch, dom, count, 0, 0, &page_array[cur_pages]);
+ xch, dom, count, 0, pod_mode, &page_array[cur_pages]);
cur_pages += count;
stat_normal_pages += count;
}
}

- /* Subtract 0x20 from target_pages for the VGA "hole". Xen will
- * adjust the PoD cache size so that domain tot_pages will be
- * target_pages - 0x20 after this call. */
- if ( pod_mode )
- rc = xc_domain_set_pod_target(xch, dom, target_pages - 0x20,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
if ( rc != 0 )
{
PERROR("Could not allocate memory for HVM guest.");
diff -r 6d56e31fe1e1 -r be8ae5439a88 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Wed Aug 15 09:41:21 2012 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Thu Aug 16 10:14:11 2012 +0200
@@ -344,8 +344,9 @@ p2m_pod_set_mem_target(struct domain *d,

pod_lock(p2m);

- /* P == B: Nothing to do. */
- if ( p2m->pod.entry_count == 0 )
+ /* P == B: Nothing to do (unless the guest is being created). */
+ populated = d->tot_pages - p2m->pod.count;
+ if ( populated > 0 && p2m->pod.entry_count == 0 )
goto out;

/* Don't do anything if the domain is being torn down */
@@ -357,13 +358,11 @@ p2m_pod_set_mem_target(struct domain *d,
if ( target < d->tot_pages )
goto out;

- populated = d->tot_pages - p2m->pod.count;
-
pod_target = target - populated;

/* B < T': Set the cache size equal to # of outstanding entries,
* let the balloon driver fill in the rest. */
- if ( pod_target > p2m->pod.entry_count )
+ if ( populated > 0 && pod_target > p2m->pod.entry_count )
pod_target = p2m->pod.entry_count;

ASSERT( pod_target >= p2m->pod.count );

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