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Customer-facing ACLs

 

 

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justin at justinshore

Mar 7, 2008, 11:55 AM

Post #1 of 69 (2327 views)
Permalink
Customer-facing ACLs

This question will probably get lost in the Friday afternoon lull but
we'll give it a try anyway.

What kind of customer-facing filtering do you do (ingress and egress)?
This of course is dependent on the type of customer, so lets assume
we're talking about an average residential customer.

Do you block SYNs destined to your customers? Do you rate-limit SYNs
destined for your customers? SYNs on privileged ports?

Do you block any customer-facing egress traffic at all? What about
ingress? SMTP, NetBIOS, MS-SQL, common proxy ports (3128, 6588)?

What ICMP types do you allow or disallow?

I'm assuming everyone uses uRPF at all their edges already so that
eliminates the need for specific ACEs with ingress/egress network
verification checks.

Do you filter anything destined to your network infrastructure on your
customer-facing edges? Does anyone filter traffic destined to the PE
side of a PE-CE link from the outside world?

For those of you with cable networks, what all do you block with the CM?
We're considering blocking NetBIOS and DHCP server traffic (DHCP
server packets are already blocked at the CMTS but this would keep that
junk off our infrastructure).

For SMTP we permit access to our SMTP servers on tcp/25 to all our
broadband users. We also permit our customers with static IPs
(residential and business) to send SMTP without restrictions. After
those permits we explicitly block tcp/25. This has worked fairly well
for us. It sure makes it easy to find infected PCs with spambots. We
don't touch tcp/587.

For ICMP we permit echo, replies, packet-too-big, and time-exceeded.
Everything else gets dropped. Frags are explicitly dropped before any
permits.

We also block common proxy ports to and from the customers (the to
includes ports not always used for proxies). This has been very
effective in catching a number of bots that scanned for open Squid
proxies or script kiddie junk that used WinGate with the default settings.


Is there a BCP for customer-facing ACLs?

Justin


streiner at cluebyfour

Mar 7, 2008, 12:08 PM

Post #2 of 69 (2293 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Fri, 7 Mar 2008, Justin Shore wrote:

> Do you block any customer-facing egress traffic at all? What about ingress?
> SMTP, NetBIOS, MS-SQL, common proxy ports (3128, 6588)?
>
> What ICMP types do you allow or disallow?

In my previous life, I worked at a mid-sized ISP. A common practice for
bridged DSL customers was to block outbound traffic to the various Netbios
ports, along with a few other ports that were added at the time to keep
Slammer and friends under control. We also deployed filters through
RADIUS that covered much of the same ground for dialup and PPPoE DSL users
and it worked reasonably well.

I do recall weighing the merits of extending that to drop outbound SMTP to
exerything except our mail farm, but it wasn't deployed because there was
a geat deal a fear of customer backlash and that it would drive more calls
into the call center.

jms


Valdis.Kletnieks at vt

Mar 7, 2008, 12:12 PM

Post #3 of 69 (2285 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:55:05 CST, Justin Shore said:

> I'm assuming everyone uses uRPF at all their edges already so that
> eliminates the need for specific ACEs with ingress/egress network
> verification checks.

You're new here, aren't you? :)


justin at justinshore

Mar 7, 2008, 12:19 PM

Post #4 of 69 (2288 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Valdis.Kletnieks[at]vt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:55:05 CST, Justin Shore said:
>
>> I'm assuming everyone uses uRPF at all their edges already so that
>> eliminates the need for specific ACEs with ingress/egress network
>> verification checks.
>
> You're new here, aren't you? :)

Hopefully optimistic. Don't bum me out going into a weekend... :-)

From the looks of my ingress BOGON ACLs on my borders (yes, I'm using
ACLs and not null routes for a reason) I'd most people not reading NANOG
(and maybe even some of them!) are not doing any ingress filtering on
their customer source IPs. Sad....

Justin


dan at beanfield

Mar 7, 2008, 12:21 PM

Post #5 of 69 (2285 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

I would *love* to be able to run uRPF on all of our edge devices, but we
use Cisco ME3400s, 3550s, 3560s and they don't support it. :-(




Valdis.Kletnieks[at]vt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:55:05 CST, Justin Shore said:
>
>
>> I'm assuming everyone uses uRPF at all their edges already so that
>> eliminates the need for specific ACEs with ingress/egress network
>> verification checks.
>>
>
> You're new here, aren't you? :)
>


rbeverly at rbeverly

Mar 7, 2008, 12:35 PM

Post #6 of 69 (2288 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 01:55:05PM -0600, Justin Shore wrote:
> What kind of customer-facing filtering do you do (ingress and egress)?
> This of course is dependent on the type of customer, so lets assume
> we're talking about an average residential customer.
...

As part of a recent measurement project, we estimate the prevalence
of ingress and egress blocking (though under the guise of neutrality).
For customer facing filters, we leverage protocols which provide
port-specific redirects, e.g. HTTP, Gnutella, etc. For traffic
toward customers, we use port-specific tcptraceroutes. Some published
data for the curious:
http://ana.csail.mit.edu/rsp/

Reader's digest summary: NetBIOS ports (and the innocent profile
service) 135-139 are among the most frequently blocked, along
with SMTP, POP3 and filters that have stuck around due to various
worms such as MS-SQL. That said, around 94% of the 16bit port
space was unblocked by any network.

Curious to other's answer to this high-level question -- and the
more mundane question of filter maintenance.

rob


kgasso-lists at visp

Mar 7, 2008, 12:43 PM

Post #7 of 69 (2287 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Justin M. Streiner wrote:
> I do recall weighing the merits of extending that to drop outbound SMTP
> to exerything except our mail farm, but it wasn't deployed because there
> was a geat deal a fear of customer backlash and that it would drive more
> calls into the call center.

This seems to be very common practice these days for larger ISPs/dialup
aggregators using the appropriate RADIUS attributes on supported access
servers.

We generally restrict outbound SMTP on our dial-up users so they may
only reach our hosts (or the mail hosts of our wholesale customers).
Our DSL subscribers, both dynamic and static, are currently unfiltered
-- but we're very quick to react to abuse incidents and apply filters
when necessary until the user cleans up their network.

I'm currently on the fence with regards to filtering SMTP for all of our
dynamic DSL folks. It'd be nice to prevent abuse before it happens, but
it's a matter of finding the time to integrate the filtering into our
wholesale backend and making sure there aren't any unforeseen issues.

-- Kameron


tims at donet

Mar 7, 2008, 12:48 PM

Post #8 of 69 (2281 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

We also use ingress bogon ACLs at our borders.

--
Tim Sanderson, network administrator
tims[at]donet.com


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog[at]merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog[at]merit.edu] On Behalf Of Justin Shore
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2008 3:20 PM
To: Valdis.Kletnieks[at]vt.edu
Cc: NANOG
Subject: Re: Customer-facing ACLs


Valdis.Kletnieks[at]vt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:55:05 CST, Justin Shore said:
>
>> I'm assuming everyone uses uRPF at all their edges already so that
>> eliminates the need for specific ACEs with ingress/egress network
>> verification checks.
>
> You're new here, aren't you? :)

Hopefully optimistic. Don't bum me out going into a weekend... :-)

From the looks of my ingress BOGON ACLs on my borders (yes, I'm using
ACLs and not null routes for a reason) I'd most people not reading NANOG
(and maybe even some of them!) are not doing any ingress filtering on
their customer source IPs. Sad....

Justin


danny at tcb

Mar 7, 2008, 12:55 PM

Post #9 of 69 (2285 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Mar 7, 2008, at 12:55 PM, Justin Shore wrote:

>
> This question will probably get lost in the Friday afternoon lull
> but we'll give it a try anyway.
>
> What kind of customer-facing filtering do you do (ingress and
> egress)? This of course is dependent on the type of customer, so
> lets assume we're talking about an average residential customer.

We did ask some of these questions in the latest Infrastructure
Security Survey, available here:

http://www.arbornetworks.com/report

Or here if you'd prefer not to register:

http://www.tcb.net/wisr_2007_v3.pdf

We're in the process of putting the next round of questions
together, so if there are things you'd like added please let us
know.

-danny


surfer at mauigateway

Mar 7, 2008, 1:22 PM

Post #10 of 69 (2286 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

---------------------------------------
> What kind of customer-facing filtering do you do (ingress and
> egress)? This of course is dependent on the type of customer, so
> lets assume we're talking about an average residential customer.
---------------------------------------


From a port-blocking point of view, some companies give access to the entire internet (good and bad) to their customers. Mine are mostly residential.

scott



fire + gasoline = religious argument on this issue that we've had *many* times in the past... ;-)


frnkblk at iname

Mar 7, 2008, 2:17 PM

Post #11 of 69 (2283 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Same concerns here. Glad to know we're not alone.

I think a transition to blocking outbound SMTP (except for one's own e-mail
servers) would benefit from an education campaign, but perhaps the pain
level is small enough that it can implemented without. One could start
doing a subnet block a day to keep the helpdesk people sane, and then apply
a global block at the edge once "done" to catch any subnets that one might
have missed.

Frank

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog[at]merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog[at]merit.edu] On Behalf Of
Kameron Gasso
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2008 2:44 PM
To: Justin M. Streiner
Cc: NANOG
Subject: Re: Customer-facing ACLs


Justin M. Streiner wrote:
> I do recall weighing the merits of extending that to drop outbound SMTP
> to exerything except our mail farm, but it wasn't deployed because there
> was a geat deal a fear of customer backlash and that it would drive more
> calls into the call center.

This seems to be very common practice these days for larger ISPs/dialup
aggregators using the appropriate RADIUS attributes on supported access
servers.

We generally restrict outbound SMTP on our dial-up users so they may
only reach our hosts (or the mail hosts of our wholesale customers).
Our DSL subscribers, both dynamic and static, are currently unfiltered
-- but we're very quick to react to abuse incidents and apply filters
when necessary until the user cleans up their network.

I'm currently on the fence with regards to filtering SMTP for all of our
dynamic DSL folks. It'd be nice to prevent abuse before it happens, but
it's a matter of finding the time to integrate the filtering into our
wholesale backend and making sure there aren't any unforeseen issues.

-- Kameron


justin at justinshore

Mar 7, 2008, 2:54 PM

Post #12 of 69 (2283 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Scott Weeks wrote:

> fire + gasoline = religious argument on this issue that we've had *many* times in the past... ;-)

I wore my flame-retardent tidy whiteys today though so I'm prepared. :-)

I can understand the problem from both camps. As a tech-savvy user I
don't want my provider to filter my Internet (I pay for both halves!).
However having spent more time that I care to admit doing customer
support and as a SP engineer I recognize the need to protect the masses
who can't (or can't be bothered to) do it for themselves. SPs are
really damned if we do and damned if we don't. Frankly I would rather
do something than nothing. My overhead will increase in all categories
if I do nothing. Infected hosts consume a significant portion of my
resources. Tackling the problem reduces my overall support costs,
increases 99% of my customers' overall satisfaction with our prices and
services, but increases my labor costs and will spurn the ire of the 1%
of my users who are tech-savvy enough to want/need unfiltered Internet
access (or even understand the full implications of it, beyond the
"they're filtering something that was sent to me!" limited thought
process).

To me there is no question of whether or not you filter traffic for
residential broadband customers. The only thing beyond that is whether
you as a SP also offer unfiltered packages. I personally thought the
old SpeakEasy model was a nice approach. The unfiltered SysAdmin
package was the perfect solution in my opinion. With my userbase I can
think of only a tiny fraction of the users who would need such an
offering. This would provide an acceptable solution for that very small
percentage of users that need this kind of access. The other 99% of the
users reap the benefits of our filtering. Problem solved IMHO.

So that only leaves the question of what ports to block or rate-limit.
Minimizing FPs is important. I think one could probably block 90% of
the common crap without too much overhead. The remaining 10% would
likely require too much labor to be worthwhile unless you were a sizable
entity and could justify you R&D by the sheer mass of your userbase.

Justin


dave.nanog at alfordmedia

Mar 7, 2008, 3:39 PM

Post #13 of 69 (2281 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

> To me there is no question of whether or not you filter traffic for
> residential broadband customers.

SBC in my area (Dallas) went from wide open to outbound 25 blocked by
default/opened on request. I think doing the same thing with port 22 would
hardly be an undue burden on users, and would help keep botnets in check.
--
Dave Pooser, ACSA
Manager of Information Services
Alford Media http://www.alfordmedia.com


surfer at mauigateway

Mar 7, 2008, 3:57 PM

Post #14 of 69 (2282 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

--- dave.nanog[at]alfordmedia.com wrote:

> To me there is no question of whether or not you filter traffic for
> residential broadband customers.

SBC in my area (Dallas) went from wide open to outbound 25 blocked by
default/opened on request. I think doing the same thing with port 22 would
hardly be an undue burden on users, and would help keep botnets in check.
------------------------------------------------


Might as well do TCP 20, 21 and 23, too. Woah, that slope's getting slippery!

scott


Jason.Carpenter at citadelgroup

Mar 7, 2008, 4:15 PM

Post #15 of 69 (2287 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

That's the problem isn't it? Who decides what can and cant go through. I think the tier approach is better, a basic user account where everything is blocked and a Sysadmin type account where everything is open. If the price is different enough then only people who are going to use those extra ports will actually pay for it.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog[at]merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog[at]merit.edu] On Behalf Of Scott Weeks
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2008 5:57 PM
To: nanog[at]merit.edu
Subject: Re: Customer-facing ACLs




--- dave.nanog[at]alfordmedia.com wrote:

> To me there is no question of whether or not you filter traffic for
> residential broadband customers.

SBC in my area (Dallas) went from wide open to outbound 25 blocked by
default/opened on request. I think doing the same thing with port 22 would
hardly be an undue burden on users, and would help keep botnets in check.
------------------------------------------------


Might as well do TCP 20, 21 and 23, too. Woah, that slope's getting slippery!

scott



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dave.nanog at alfordmedia

Mar 7, 2008, 4:49 PM

Post #16 of 69 (2287 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

> Might as well do TCP 20, 21 and 23, too. Woah, that slope's getting slippery!

Do bots try brute force attacks on Telnet and FTP? All I see at my firewall
are SSH attacks and spam. But sure, if there's a lot of Telnet abuse block
23 too; I think it's used about as rarely by "normal" customers as SSH is.

And I'm amazed how often "slippery slope" arguments are deployed to oppose
any sort of change at all. What percentage of consumer broadband users do
you think use SSH to connect to remote servers? 1%? 0.1%? 0.01%? It seems
intuitively obvious that the number of people who will call the help desk to
unblock their SSH (which should be a ~2 minute call anyway, if not a
self-service Web page with captcha) would be an order of magnitude less than
the number of remote network users who WON'T be calling/emailing your abuse
desk to complain about bots on your network hammering their servers.
--
Dave Pooser, ACSA
Manager of Information Services
Alford Media http://www.alfordmedia.com


surfer at mauigateway

Mar 7, 2008, 5:21 PM

Post #17 of 69 (2281 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

--- Jason.Carpenter[at]citadelgroup.com wrote:

That's the problem isn't it? Who decides what can and cant go through. I think the tier approach is better, a basic user account where everything is blocked and a Sysadmin type account where everything is open. If the price is different enough then only people who are going to use those extra ports will actually pay for it.
----------------------------------------------------


We need to take this off-line. All long timers are groaning, rolling their eyes and putting this in their kill file.

Try convincing your product managers to create a new product just to appease 'sysadmin types'.

scott


fergdawg at netzero

Mar 7, 2008, 6:22 PM

Post #18 of 69 (2284 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- -- "Scott Weeks" <surfer[at]mauigateway.com> wrote:

>We need to take this off-line. All long timers are groaning, rolling
>their eyes and putting this in their kill file.
>
>Try convincing your product managers to create a new product just to
>appease 'sysadmin types'.
>

Or perhaps engage the discussion on a security-related mailing
list.

A couple of suggestions:

The DShield list:
http://lists.dshield.org/mailman/listinfo/list

Funsec:
https://linuxbox.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/funsec

- - ferg

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--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
Engineering Architecture for the Internet
fergdawg(at)netzero.net
ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


justin at justinshore

Mar 7, 2008, 6:44 PM

Post #19 of 69 (2280 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Scott Weeks wrote:
> We need to take this off-line. All long timers are groaning, rolling their eyes and putting this in their kill file.

Are the long-timers groaning and ignoring this thread? I certainly hope
not. It's threads like these that need the benefit of their experience
the most. Perhaps the long-timers could recommend a better destination
for queries like these because I have more questions I want to ask (my
next being about walled gardens). If they're tired of answering the
same threads over and over again, then the query must be common enough
to warrant a BCP or at the very least a couple documents in a
knowledgebase somewhere. Perhaps my Google-fu isn't what it used to be
but I couldn't manage to find any relevant docs online; not even a NANOG
presentation.

> Try convincing your product managers to create a new product just to appease 'sysadmin types'.

We're not in the business of alienating any customers. If we can create
a bundle that meets a group of potential customers' needs we will. It's
just another paragraph on the sales literature that we give our CSRs and
a little more work that I'll have to do in configuration. I'm planning
on rolling out SOHO and Gamer packages this year. Adding a SysAdmin
package wouldn't be much additional work. I predict the adoption rate
to be the highest with the Gamer package, followed by the SOHO package
and finally the SysAdmin package.

I hope this thread isn't destined for an untimely death. I've received
a number of off-list queries for summary information because those
individuals are also interested in customer-facing ACLs. The
information I have to summarize at this point is brief and incomplete.

Justin


andy at xecu

Mar 7, 2008, 6:54 PM

Post #20 of 69 (2287 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Fri, 7 Mar 2008, Dave Pooser wrote:

>
> > Might as well do TCP 20, 21 and 23, too. Woah, that slope's getting slippery!
>
> Do bots try brute force attacks on Telnet and FTP? All I see at my firewall
> are SSH attacks and spam. But sure, if there's a lot of Telnet abuse block
> 23 too; I think it's used about as rarely by "normal" customers as SSH is.
>
> And I'm amazed how often "slippery slope" arguments are deployed to oppose
> any sort of change at all. What percentage of consumer broadband users do
> you think use SSH to connect to remote servers? 1%? 0.1%? 0.01%? It seems
> intuitively obvious that the number of people who will call the help desk to
> unblock their SSH (which should be a ~2 minute call anyway, if not a
> self-service Web page with captcha) would be an order of magnitude less than
> the number of remote network users who WON'T be calling/emailing your abuse
> desk to complain about bots on your network hammering their servers.

Just straight up blocking outbound ports (with the debatable exception of
port 25) seems heavy handed and too slanted toward admin convenience over
customer satisfaction. It's a slippery slope because unlike with spam,
people who are affected by brute force attacks have some degree of
complicity through either negligance or laziness. Once you decide it's
your job to protect other people's networks from their own stupidity, you
may as well do full blown deep packet inspection and look for customers
who are using your network to download kiddie porn...step by step you get
closer to losing safe harbor, or at least having to pay a lawyer to
convince otherwise.


Perhaps a more thoughtful solution would work, but would take a bit of
engineering. Ideally you would only block a certain class of
brute-forceable ports once you cross some threshold amount of brief TCP
sessions in a given period.

I would suspect an extremely low false positive rate of blocking the ports
of a user who has had, say 100 brief telnet, ssh, ftp, pop, or imap
sessions in 5 minutes.

Perhaps instead of filtering just those ports, you instead do a captive
portal where they forced to a webapp which presents them with the logs of
their issues and the suggestion they may be compromised, along with
locally reachable resources to assist in correcting the issue. But just in
case, if they feel it was an accidental situation (a perl script gone mad,
say), they could merely click a button to open them right back up.
However, three strikes and you're out until an admin reviews the case and
considers the feedback ("we run a cyber cafe, sometimes people come in
with messed up laptops") and implements a whitelisting.

Remember, YOUR customers are what matter.

Andy

---
Andy Dills
Xecunet, Inc.
www.xecu.net
301-682-9972
---


adrian at creative

Mar 7, 2008, 7:26 PM

Post #21 of 69 (2289 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

On Fri, Mar 07, 2008, Justin Shore wrote:
>
> Scott Weeks wrote:
> >We need to take this off-line. All long timers are groaning, rolling
> >their eyes and putting this in their kill file.
>
> Are the long-timers groaning and ignoring this thread? I certainly hope
> not. It's threads like these that need the benefit of their experience
> the most. Perhaps the long-timers could recommend a better destination
> for queries like these because I have more questions I want to ask (my
> next being about walled gardens). If they're tired of answering the
> same threads over and over again, then the query must be common enough
> to warrant a BCP or at the very least a couple documents in a
> knowledgebase somewhere. Perhaps my Google-fu isn't what it used to be
> but I couldn't manage to find any relevant docs online; not even a NANOG
> presentation.

*waves* hai, I'm not an old-timer, but I'm still peripherally involved in this.

As another poster pointed out, the access-list (and shaping! heh) rules
available via RADIUS Vendor AV extensions are very, very useful.
The little ISP I poke from time to time makes extensive use of them.

The accounting software has some rudimentary profile support, so there's
various "types" of customers which get certain RADIUS attributes. This allows
for "smart", "home", "business", and "adrian" users. Each gets different
ACLs and shaping rules. There's a "walled garden" subnet for clients who
haven't paid their bills.

I haven't yet sat down and figured out how to drop users into a VRF based
on something in the RADIUS reply, as this'd make for some very useful
VPN and walled garden implementations, but its certainly on my todo list.
Right after "figure out IPv6", which is next on my list.

Those running larger Cisco bbagg setups aren't rolling the old-school
RADIUS authentication; Cisco apparently have some "better" stuff available now.
I can't comment on its effectiveness for accounting/authorisation/filtering.

> >Try convincing your product managers to create a new product just to
> >appease 'sysadmin types'.
>
> We're not in the business of alienating any customers. If we can create
> a bundle that meets a group of potential customers' needs we will. It's
> just another paragraph on the sales literature that we give our CSRs and
> a little more work that I'll have to do in configuration. I'm planning
> on rolling out SOHO and Gamer packages this year. Adding a SysAdmin
> package wouldn't be much additional work. I predict the adoption rate
> to be the highest with the Gamer package, followed by the SOHO package
> and finally the SysAdmin package.
>
> I hope this thread isn't destined for an untimely death. I've received
> a number of off-list queries for summary information because those
> individuals are also interested in customer-facing ACLs. The
> information I have to summarize at this point is brief and incomplete.

I'll update the NANOG Wiki with whatever information pops up.

Amusingly, a newish WISP out here in Western Australia seems to have
not implemented this sort of stuff, and wireless clients on the same
node can see other local customers. I think their CPE device is a "bridge",
and this is about as dangerous as it sounds. It would be nice to have
a BCP or presentation covering the how's and why's for the newer entrants
into ths market.

(Although that said, why would you help them? In business, you may just
want (some of) your competitors to fail. :)



Adrian


dave.nanog at alfordmedia

Mar 7, 2008, 7:38 PM

Post #22 of 69 (2292 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

> Just straight up blocking outbound ports (with the debatable exception of
> port 25) seems heavy handed and too slanted toward admin convenience over
> customer satisfaction. It's a slippery slope because unlike with spam,
> people who are affected by brute force attacks have some degree of
> complicity through either negligance or laziness.

Sure, and I could* make the argument that since I have great spam filtering
inbound I don't have to care about outbound spam from my network because if
you receive it it's because of your negligence/laziness. But I think that in
the case of spam as in the case of brute force attacks it's still the
network operator's obligation to be a good netizen providing doing so places
no undue burden on his own customers or his own staff.

Blocking port 25 outbound for dynamic users until they specifically request
it be unblocked seems to me to meet the "no undue burden" test; so would
port 22 and 23. Beyond that, I'd probably be hesitant until I either started
getting a significant number of abuse reports about a certain flavor of
traffic that I had reason to believe was used by only a tiny minority of my
own users.

*but won't, ever
--
Dave Pooser, ACSA
Manager of Information Services
Alford Media http://www.alfordmedia.com


blakjak at blakjak

Mar 7, 2008, 8:02 PM

Post #23 of 69 (2293 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

> Blocking port 25 outbound for dynamic users until they specifically request
> it be unblocked seems to me to meet the "no undue burden" test; so would
> port 22 and 23. Beyond that, I'd probably be hesitant until I either started
> getting a significant number of abuse reports about a certain flavor of
> traffic that I had reason to believe was used by only a tiny minority of my
> own users.
>

Sorry, I must've missed something.
Port 25 outbound (excepting ISP SMTP server) seems entirely logical to me.

Port 22 outbound? And 23? Telnet and SSH _outbound_ cause that much of a
concern? I can only assume it's to stop clients exploited boxen being used
to anonymise further telnet/ssh attempts - but have to admit this
discussion is the first i've heard of it being done 'en masse'.

It'd frustrate me if I jacked into a friends Internet in order to do some
legitimate SSH based server administration, I imagine...

Is this not 'reaching' or is there a genuine benefit in blocking these
ports as well?

Mark.


joelja at bogus

Mar 7, 2008, 8:12 PM

Post #24 of 69 (2290 views)
Permalink
Re: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

Dave Pooser wrote:
>> To me there is no question of whether or not you filter traffic for
>> residential broadband customers.
>
> SBC in my area (Dallas) went from wide open to outbound 25 blocked by
> default/opened on request. I think doing the same thing with port 22 would

also people who do real work...

> hardly be an undue burden on users, and would help keep botnets in check.

it would cause me to be a customer of a different service.


frnkblk at iname

Mar 7, 2008, 9:29 PM

Post #25 of 69 (2287 views)
Permalink
RE: Customer-facing ACLs [In reply to]

The last few spam incidents I measured an outflow of about 2 messages per
second. Does anyone know how aggressive Telnet and SSH scanning is? Even
if it was greater, it's my guess there are many more hosts spewing spam than
there are running abusive telnet and SSH scans.

Frank

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-nanog[at]merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog[at]merit.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
Foster
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2008 10:02 PM
To: Dave Pooser
Cc: nanog[at]merit.edu
Subject: Re: Customer-facing ACLs


> Blocking port 25 outbound for dynamic users until they specifically
request
> it be unblocked seems to me to meet the "no undue burden" test; so would
> port 22 and 23. Beyond that, I'd probably be hesitant until I either
started
> getting a significant number of abuse reports about a certain flavor of
> traffic that I had reason to believe was used by only a tiny minority of
my
> own users.
>

Sorry, I must've missed something.
Port 25 outbound (excepting ISP SMTP server) seems entirely logical to me.

Port 22 outbound? And 23? Telnet and SSH _outbound_ cause that much of a
concern? I can only assume it's to stop clients exploited boxen being used
to anonymise further telnet/ssh attempts - but have to admit this
discussion is the first i've heard of it being done 'en masse'.

It'd frustrate me if I jacked into a friends Internet in order to do some
legitimate SSH based server administration, I imagine...

Is this not 'reaching' or is there a genuine benefit in blocking these
ports as well?

Mark.

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