
alanr at unix
Feb 20, 2003, 2:30 PM
Post #7 of 7
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Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote: > On 2003-02-20T13:27:57, > Brian Tinsley <btlists [at] emageon> said: > > >>I've got equipment on order to test the ServeRAID clustering support. >>It's new for Linux. You will not need STONITH in this configuration, the >>ServeRAID adapters handle the fencing themselves. > > > You still need STONITH support in some scenarios: > > - If both nodes want to bring online the IP, they'll compete for the ARP cache > entry. The ARP cache entry is a shared resource, just like storage. Funny > things will occur if the IP is configured more than once on the same subnet. > > Certainly the data is protected better, but the service might as well be > down. But, as soon as connectivity recovers, they will negotiate so that the ARP gets straightened out. If you've pulled the ethernet cable from one machine, then you won't have this issue at all (only one will be able to ARP). If you're running IPfail, then it will all work quite nicely, and the service will migrate to the machine with working connectivity. In all probability, if both machines can be seen from the outside,then they can see each other. If there was a connectivity failure, then it will likely be short-lived. If you configure yourself with redundant communication paths, and are running something like IPfail, you should be in very good shape by most standards. > - If running, for example, NFS on top of that, sure you pulled out the storage > _underneath_, but now two nodes are exposing the NFS mount, which can lead > to clients believing they are talking to a corrupted NFS server et al. > > - And you also do not want two nodes ping-ponging the ServeRAID reservation > between them ;) Actually, they won't do that. One side will just moan and complain that it can't talk to the disk. When connectivity is restored, everything will go into a sane state. > - And maybe I have forgotten something here, and maybe you should be more > paranoid than I am and fear malfunctioning controllers ;-) Nothing protects you against that except for good backups ;-) Fencing is of no help whatsoever. Ditto for misbehaving applications, filesystems, and OSes. > So certainly, it is a valuable additional safeguard. The assumption that > fencing / shooting a failed node is no longer necessary however is not quite > true; it is still a very good idea to have. It is probably not *necessary* in most cases. This is NOT a disagreement that it would be a good idea to have. -- Alan Robertson <alanr [at] unix> "Openness is the foundation and preservative of friendship.... Let me claim from you at all times your undisguised opinions." - William Wilberforce
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