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changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used]

 

 

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dkg at fifthhorseman

May 29, 2012, 8:51 AM

Post #1 of 22 (385 views)
Permalink
changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used]

On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Use
>
> gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg
>
> to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to
> find the key on a server, etc.

i've seen a lot of these mistakes where people seem to think that 32-bit
keyids are somehow collision-resistant. For example:

https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/uds-announce/2012-May/000234.html

Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short"
to "long"? certainly, the 64-bit keyID itself is not as
collision-resistant as the full fingerprint, but it does raise the bar
for an attacker (and discourages users from just parrotting the 32-bit
keyid if they don't understand what they're looking at).

I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing.

What do other people think?

--dkg
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mailinglisten at hauke-laging

May 29, 2012, 9:02 AM

Post #2 of 22 (380 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:51:06 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor:

> I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing.

A smaller change which should "solve" most of these problems could be to
change the error message. If gpg is operating with the short format then a
respective hint could be added:

"gpg is currently operation with short ID format. This prevents short ID
collisions from being easily detected. You may want to run gpg with the option
'--keyid-format long' to check the long IDs."


Hauke
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kf at sumptuouscapital

May 29, 2012, 9:13 AM

Post #3 of 22 (381 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 2012-05-29 17:51, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:

...

> I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good
> Thing.
>

I agree, and don't see much of a reason not to use a long KeyID rather
than a short one.

However, please note that search for subkeys using the long keyID
format is only supported in SKS since version 1.1.3 announced 11 April
2012 (lookup for parent/regular public keys is supported before that),
so before implementing such a change I'd like to consider setting the
minimum requirement for the SKS pool[0] to 1.1.3.

Technically that is a rather easy change, however, it'd currently
reduce the number of available servers to about 15 from 61 in the pool
with min version requrement of 1.1.0 (current). So might have to give
the keyserver administrators some time to upgrade before that.

(cross posting to sks-devel)

[0] http://sks-keyservers.net/status/

- --
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
http://www.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Corruptissima re publica plurimć leges
The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws
- ----------------------------
This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP
standard. If you want to read more about this
The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An
introduction to OpenPGP security is now
available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback
format at
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/
- ----------------------------
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/
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rjh at sixdemonbag

May 29, 2012, 9:31 AM

Post #4 of 22 (381 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On 5/29/12 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short"
> to "long"?

Hurts interoperability. Once someone learns the process on PGP or
BouncyCastle or [insert OpenPGP implementation here], they're going to
want to take those same skills over to GnuPG. Those other
implementations overwhelmingly display short key IDs; if they come to
GnuPG expecting short key IDs and see long ones, we'll see a sea of
questions of "why did my key ID change when I imported it from PGP to
GnuPG?"

(Hmm. "Interoperability" might be the wrong word, but there's not a
good term for "skill portability.")

Anyway, it's not that I think this change is _a priori_ bad, but in
order to diminish the skill portability issues (both in moving from
other implementations to GnuPG and from GnuPG to other implementations)
I think this change should not be implemented without some coordination
with the other major implementations.

Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC
already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an
implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems
to be an entirely reasonable addition.

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wk at gnupg

May 29, 2012, 10:18 AM

Post #5 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Tue, 29 May 2012 18:31, rjh [at] sixdemonbag said:

> Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC
> already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an
> implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems

I bet that this will immediately start a discussion on a v5 key format
to fix this problem for “all” time. And obviously the suggestion will
then be to show the full, then, SHA-256 fingerprint.

Frontends should handle this problem. For example they could show all
matching keys after a decryption problem. Hiding the keyID from the
user would even be better - the mail address should be sufficient for
99% of all users. For the experts, a “Details” button can show all the
glory details of the key.


Salam-Shalom,

Werner

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dougb at dougbarton

May 29, 2012, 10:28 AM

Post #6 of 22 (378 views)
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Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 5/29/2012 10:18 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Hiding the keyID from the user would even be better - the mail
> address should be sufficient for 99% of all users.

I use the e-mail address for almost all of my command-line work, FWIW.


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rjh at sixdemonbag

May 29, 2012, 10:44 AM

Post #7 of 22 (374 views)
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Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 5/29/12 1:18 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Frontends should handle this problem.

The problem is that most people developing front ends are making them
pretty darn user-hostile.

A few years ago while taking some HCI courses, I did a usability study
on the most common certificate interface -- the tabular widget. It
turned out to be just beyond-Godawful.

<rant follows>

Tabular data is the Right Thing To Do in two major use cases.

The first is when you have a noninteractive display of identical
field(s) for multiple pieces of data. Consider a printed almanac: if it
wants to convey a list of countries and populations, the best way to do
it is with a table. Different records (countries), identical fields
(population), and since the paper is noninteractive, the table is a win.

Now consider if instead of an almanac you have Wolfram Alpha. Typing
"population of Switzerland" immediately yields *just* the data you want,
and you don't get confused by your eye accidentally jumping a row and
reading the population of Sweden instead. A table widget is more prone
to misreadings.

The second Big Win for tables is when data must be contextualized by
other data. Consider a spreadsheet showing profits and losses for
different divisions of a business: if all you know is that a given
division made $X, you don't know if that's your most profitable
division, your least profitable division, or what-have-you. The other
data is necessary to put the data you're interested in into a larger
context.

Now consider the tabular widget as used in PGPkeys, GPA, the Enigmail
key manager, etcetera. The certificates don't need to be
contextualized: all the data necessary to evaluate a certificate is
present in the same record as the certificate. And since it's a
graphical application the interface can be interactive, which means the
other major use-case isn't applicable here.

Enigmail tries to have its cake and eat it too by prominently featuring
a large search box at the top of the window. But this isn't a very good
solution. In terms of screen real estate, about five-sixths of the
screen is taken up by the tabular widget. The search box takes up a
relatively small portion. The human eye tends to view large things as
more important than small things -- so the center of attention is
naturally drawn to the tabular widget, not the search box. Further, the
human eye tends to view complex things as more important than simple
things -- so the eye is drawn to the tabular widget again, not the
search box. I'm grateful Enigmail has a search box in the certificate
manager, but I doubt if new users even notice it.

According to Google's HCI guys [2], 90% of the U.S. internet-using
population doesn't know how to use Control-F to find a word in a
document or a page. That's the level of skill most people have with
user interfaces -- awful. And if you count up the number of widgets on
the screen in your average certificate manager, you'll find that there's
more visual complexity there than in Microsoft Word.

</rant over>

Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective
user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the
word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject
alone for another couple of years. :)

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dshaw at jabberwocky

May 29, 2012, 10:47 AM

Post #8 of 22 (376 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

> On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> Use
>>
>> gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg
>>
>> to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to
>> find the key on a server, etc.
>
> i've seen a lot of these mistakes where people seem to think that 32-bit
> keyids are somehow collision-resistant. For example:
>
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/uds-announce/2012-May/000234.html
>
> Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short"
> to "long"? certainly, the 64-bit keyID itself is not as
> collision-resistant as the full fingerprint, but it does raise the bar
> for an attacker (and discourages users from just parrotting the 32-bit
> keyid if they don't understand what they're looking at).
>
> I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing.
>
> What do other people think?

I think that it would bring more confusion than benefit, unfortunately. There is a significant amount of documentation (and even code) that uses OpenPGP in terms of 32-bit key IDs, and if that if we were to change, we'd cause all sorts of problems. Defaults should be conservative.

That doesn't mean we can't start encouraging people to use 64-bit IDs, but I don't expect it to be a quick process.

What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision?

David


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dshaw at jabberwocky

May 29, 2012, 10:47 AM

Post #9 of 22 (376 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On May 29, 2012, at 1:18 PM, Werner Koch wrote:

> On Tue, 29 May 2012 18:31, rjh [at] sixdemonbag said:
>
>> Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC
>> already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an
>> implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems
>
> I bet that this will immediately start a discussion on a v5 key format
> to fix this problem for “all” time. And obviously the suggestion will
> then be to show the full, then, SHA-256 fingerprint.

No doubt. V5 is a rather nice way to handle the problem: if a new key format came about, it's reasonable that the "handle" used to refer to it is different. Just like when things went from v3 to v4 and the fingerprint format changed, people understood that these were two different key types and accepted that they would appear different in a UI.

I daresay that designing a V5 key format might even be accomplished sooner than rooting out all the (now-incorrect) FAQs and general knowledge of people using OpenPGP to get them to use 64-bit key IDs instead of 32. ;)

David


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rjh at sixdemonbag

May 29, 2012, 10:49 AM

Post #10 of 22 (376 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 5/29/12 1:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> According to Google's HCI guys [2], 90% of the U.S. internet-using
> population doesn't know how to use Control-F to find a word in a
> document or a page.

Whoops, editing error. Should've been footnote [1], and I should've
listed it as:


http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/crazy-90-percent-of-people-dont-know-how-to-use-ctrl-f/243840/

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sam at samwhited

May 29, 2012, 11:05 AM

Post #11 of 22 (374 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw <dshaw [at] jabberwocky> wrote:
> On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>
> What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision?

Certainly both; while accidental collision isn't probable, 32-bit IDs
aren't exactly collision resistant either. This, coupled with the fact
that a nice GPGPU is now relatively inexpensive makes brute forcing
collisions not only possible, but relatively easy for a determined
attacker.

—Sam


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dshaw at jabberwocky

May 29, 2012, 11:18 AM

Post #12 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On May 29, 2012, at 2:05 PM, Sam Whited wrote:

> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw <dshaw [at] jabberwocky> wrote:
>> On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>>
>> What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision?
>
> Certainly both; while accidental collision isn't probable, 32-bit IDs
> aren't exactly collision resistant either. This, coupled with the fact
> that a nice GPGPU is now relatively inexpensive makes brute forcing
> collisions not only possible, but relatively easy for a determined
> attacker.

The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32…

David


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wk at gnupg

May 29, 2012, 12:23 PM

Post #13 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:44, rjh [at] sixdemonbag said:

> Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective
> user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the
> word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject

GPA has many different ways to show keys. IMHO the selection box which
pops up in GPA, if run as a UI-server, can't figure out the key to use.
I have always thought that this is better than the the standard GPA
frontpage, which shows all keys; despite that the most common operation
then is trying to locate the right key. A search box would make much
more sense here. However, changing such a common UI might result in a
lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned.

Yes, I am interested in your findings.


Salam-Shalom,

Werner


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dkg at fifthhorseman

May 29, 2012, 12:34 PM

Post #14 of 22 (374 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote:
> The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32…

Right, which is why gpg should default to not processing/accepting v3
keys either, frankly. The window for v3 being deprecated started long
ago. If we expect people to rely on gpg for any sort of key management,
it ought to have reasonably safe and sane defaults.

dropping v3 unless explicitly overridden, and defaulting to displaying
64-bit keyids in the places where it must show keyids seems like it
would be a reasonable choice.

Yes, it might break compatibility with some existing docs. Those docs
are likely to be out-of-date, and many of them may well encourage bad
practices anyway to someone who doesn't understand what they're seeing.

fwiw, i agree with Werner that we should avoid displaying keyids to
users wherever we can -- they're not human-friendly identifiers. But if
we're going to expose them, we should be exposing them in ways that at
least make them somewhat collision-resistant.

--dkg
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rjh at sixdemonbag

May 29, 2012, 1:30 PM

Post #15 of 22 (377 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 5/29/12 3:23 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> However, changing such a common UI might result in a
> lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned.

Absolutely. The good news, though, is that (at least in the Free
Software world) the 'market' is fragmented. No one particular key
manager holds a dominant position. Off the top of my head there's
Seahorse, Kgpg, GPA, the Enigmail key manager, and more. It's possible
for a new entry to exist without offending the users who are already
happy with the existing/dominant certificate management UI. They just
won't use the new thing, that's all -- but new users may decide to use
the better-designed interface.

> Yes, I am interested in your findings.

The code we put together was a fairly straightforward UI mockup. One
version was in Java (in a vain, misguided attempt at cross-platform
support); after that I put together one in Python that directly targeted
GNOME 2. It would need some work to overhaul it for GNOME 3 (and
possibly a lot of work, given PyGTK has been deprecated in favor of a
different kind of binding). That said, if you'll forgive me not having
a mockup ready --


1. The window was almost comically blank:

._________________________________________.
| Search for: | |
+-----------------------------------------+
| (room for a line of text, begins blank) |
+-----------------------------------------+
| (checkbox for 'Show all matches') |
+-----------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| (completely blank |
| tabular widget) |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+

In usability tests, people who already had experience with conventional
key managers absolutely hated this arrangement. They wanted to see all
the information at once. People who were new to OpenPGP were a little
confused: they weren't accustomed to windows that were mostly blank, but
they had no difficulty understanding that they needed to interact with
the search box first. An early version of this allowed users to view
all 1000+ certificates on the keyring by clicking the 'Show all matches'
checkbox immediately. This turned out to be a negative experience for
some users, who immediately felt overwhelmed by data. For this reason,
the checkbox was originally set as insensitive: only once data was
entered in the search box and the number of matches ranged between 1 and
50 did the checkbox become active.


2. As users typed things into the searchbox, the line of text would
update. For instance, if the user typed 'T' the text would say
something like, "55 certificates contain 'T'". At this point the user
could click on the checkbox if he/she wished. People seemed to
understand that they should keep typing, though. Once enough letters
were entered to reduce the matches to under seven certs, the checkbox
selected itself and the matching UIDs populated in the widget. And, of
course, as soon as the matches went <50 the user could manually select
the checkbox.

3. Typing 'RSA', 'DSA' and/or 'ELG' would further restrict keys.
Nobody cared about this feature: it was completely unused. Likewise
with ">=xxxx" and/or "<=xxxx" to restrict by key length. Nobody cared.
In hindsight, this was a horrible misfeature -- what if someone's name
contained 'rsa', 'dsa' or 'elg'? For instance, one of my classmates'
email addresses was @thetiredsaint.com; had we used his certificate as
one of our tests, I suspect people would have been driven up the wall by
this misfeature (note the "dsa" in "thetiredsaint").

4. Searching by a hex string was supported, so long as it was prefixed
with 0x.

5. Multiple search terms were treated as logical-ANDs, not logical-ORs.
People didn't want/use ORs: nobody wanted "UIDs matching 'John' or
'Smith'", they wanted "UIDs matching 'John' and 'Smith'" -- e.g., Bob
Smith would match the first but not the second.

6. Once the tabular widget was displaying UIDs, clicking on a row in
the UID would populate its key ID field. This further reduced the
cognitive load on people: rather than see 10 UIDs and 10 key IDs (a
widget count of 20 spread across two columns), there was a single column
of 10 UIDs and, *if a row was selected*, a single key ID shown -- a
widget count of 11. Some people liked this, some people absolutely
hated it. The ones who hated it tended to be the more experienced
computer users.

7. Upon clicking a UID, not only would the key ID field populate, but
the line of text would instruct the user "Double-click to view or edit
this certificate." Upon double-clicking, congratulations, the mock-up
ended -- the mock-up was only meant to test the ease of finding and
selecting the desired certificate.



Our testing was pretty rough. We had seven test subjects (a very small
sample), one of whom was very tech-savvy and the others were a fairly
normal cross-section of the undergraduates who were shambling around
through the building that day on their way to a university-required math
class. The surveys showed that they all considered themselves to be
competent with computer interfaces, but only the one considered himself
expert. They were tested on both GPA 0.3 (the latest version available
at the time) and this mock-up. From a keyring containing 1000+
certificates, we asked them to find some certificates by email address,
some by name, some by "a name like, but spelled a little differently"
(e.g., "like Bob Johnson, but the spelling of the last name may be
wrong"), and by key ID.

The results were a mixed bag but on balance positive. The very
tech-savvy subject immediately recognized the column headers in GPA
controlled per-column sorting, and used this to find desired
certificates in approximately the same time as our mock-up. The others
generally found the mock-up interface to be much faster than GPA's
interface. One subject could not complete the tasks at all with GPA; he
didn't see GPA's search box (telling us later that it was just one more
widget in a screen full of them), did not know the headers were
clickable, and so forth. After spending six minutes trying to find just
one certificate, this subject gave up on GPA.

The subject who gave up on GPA began his session by maximizing GPA to
fill the screen. He was the only subject to do so. He said he thought
it would be faster if he could look over more entries at a time, but it
appears that all that additional data was more of a cognitive burden
than a blessing.

After these trials with complete newcomers to OpenPGP, I of course
showed the user interface to some veteran OpenPGP users. A few had some
mild praise for it, but the overwhelming response was a giant "yech" and
a "I hate this interface, it feels so dumbed-down."

So, I guess you could say that we came up with an improved user
interface for newcomers, but hardly anyone who's invested time in
learning the big-tabular-widget style of manager is going to find it an
improvement. Proof positive that you can't win 'em all, I guess. :)

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dshaw at jabberwocky

May 29, 2012, 1:43 PM

Post #16 of 22 (374 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] [In reply to]

On May 29, 2012, at 3:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

> On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote:
>> The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32…
>
> Right, which is why gpg should default to not processing/accepting v3
> keys either, frankly. The window for v3 being deprecated started long
> ago. If we expect people to rely on gpg for any sort of key management,
> it ought to have reasonably safe and sane defaults.

While I don't think the world is ready for a change in default visibility from 32 to 64 bit key IDs, I am in favor of this by default.

David


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reynt0 at cs

May 29, 2012, 6:57 PM

Post #17 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Tue, 29 May 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
. . .
> Tabular data is the Right Thing To Do in two major use cases.
>
> The first is when you have a noninteractive display of identical
> field(s) for multiple pieces of data. Consider a printed almanac: if it
> wants to convey a list of countries and populations, the best way to do
> it is with a table. Different records (countries), identical fields
> (population), and since the paper is noninteractive, the table is a win.
. . .
> The second Big Win for tables is when data must be contextualized by
> other data. Consider a spreadsheet showing profits and losses for
> different divisions of a business: if all you know is that a given
> division made $X, you don't know if that's your most profitable
> division, your least profitable division, or what-have-you. The other
> data is necessary to put the data you're interested in into a larger
> context.
. . .

In general, being able to examine variation of content within
uniformity of structure is also a way to legitimate the
specific content of interest. If someone feeds you just one
answer "Special, just for you!", you may feel happy and relaxed,
but you missed the chance to see if the result you got makes
sense compared to other results. The question of legitimation
is actually a broad and significant issue.

Referring to RJH's later long description of his work, might
this kind of consideration be one possible factor in "experts'
liking tabular display more than newbies did? Context would
mean more to people who know how to evaluate it. Eg seeing
tabular output, they are always a little verifying the
current correctness of how the server is working, and so on.

If I understand RJH's description corectly, it seemed to me
that the interface he described was presenting a combination
of context and focus, including some user control over extent
of context (possibly not effectively clued control, but that
is not unusual for a pilot version of anything).

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rjh at sixdemonbag

May 29, 2012, 7:03 PM

Post #18 of 22 (378 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 5/29/12 9:57 PM, reynt0 wrote:
> In general, being able to examine variation of content within
> uniformity of structure is also a way to legitimate the
> specific content of interest.

As I said, it's useful when data must be contextualized. For a
spreadsheet, the information in one row must be put in the context of
information in other rows. This isn't the case for a certificate
manager, though: each certificate is its own self-contained entity.
Whether I have 500 RSA keys or 1 RSA key doesn't matter to me in the
slightest: I just want to look at this *one particular* RSA key, etc.

There may be a use case for contextualization in certificates, but if so
I haven't found it yet. :)


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lists at michel-messerschmidt

May 30, 2012, 1:08 AM

Post #19 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 10:03:57PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> There may be a use case for contextualization in certificates, but if so
> I haven't found it yet. :)

You may wnat to lookup up all certificates that signed a certificate.
Or just get all your certificates displayed.
Or all certificates that have been signed with your keys.

But this is not to say that a tabular representation helps for these
use cases :)



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mwood at IUPUI

May 30, 2012, 6:40 AM

Post #20 of 22 (377 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 09:23:08PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:44, rjh [at] sixdemonbag said:
>
> > Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective
> > user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the
> > word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject
>
> GPA has many different ways to show keys. IMHO the selection box which
> pops up in GPA, if run as a UI-server, can't figure out the key to use.
> I have always thought that this is better than the the standard GPA
> frontpage, which shows all keys; despite that the most common operation
> then is trying to locate the right key. A search box would make much
> more sense here. However, changing such a common UI might result in a
> lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned.

Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool.
There's plenty of unused space to the right of "[bunch of keys] Key
manager". To say nothing of the (perhaps peculiar) custom of placing
a "Find" operation on Edit menus. The tabular display can stay where
it is. Perhaps the search function (when there is one) could scroll
it, or sort all of the current hits to the top of the table widget's
viewport.

I've been meaning to do something about that but, I'm ashamed to say,
I haven't gotten it done.

--
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood [at] IUPUI
Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart.


rjh at sixdemonbag

May 30, 2012, 7:16 AM

Post #21 of 22 (374 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On 05/30/2012 09:40 AM, Mark H. Wood wrote:
> Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool.

Taking a look at GPA, it seems that 0.9.0 no longer compiles on a modern
UNIX -- it expects libassuan-1.x, apparently, and libassuan's now in a
version 2.

I wasn't able to get the git checkout to work, either, due to a gettext
infrastructure mismatch. The Makefile.in.in came from 0.17, but the
autoconf macros on my system are from 0.18.

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wk at gnupg

May 30, 2012, 7:45 AM

Post #22 of 22 (375 views)
Permalink
Re: changing the default for --keyid-format [In reply to]

On Wed, 30 May 2012 16:16, rjh [at] sixdemonbag said:
> On 05/30/2012 09:40 AM, Mark H. Wood wrote:
>> Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool.
>
> Taking a look at GPA, it seems that 0.9.0 no longer compiles on a modern
> UNIX -- it expects libassuan-1.x, apparently, and libassuan's now in a
> version 2.

There is a new release:

Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.2 (2012-05-02)
------------------------------------------------
* Adjust server mode to modern Libassuan.

* Add options --enable-logging for W32.

* Add options --gpg-binary, --gpgsm-binary and --debug-edit-fsm.

* Properly process CMS data in the clipboard and with the server's
VERIFY_FILES and DECRYPT_FILES commands.

* Minor code cleanups.


Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.1 (2012-04-18)
------------------------------------------------

* The key selection dialogs for encryption and signing do not anymore
list expired, revoked or otherwise invalid keys.

* If no recipients are given to the server, a generic key selection
dialog is now used.

* Now works with Libassuan 2.x.

* The card manager now displays the ATR for an unknown card.



Shalom-Salam,

Werner

--
Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


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