ken.gilmour at gmail
Feb 19, 2012, 11:45 PM
Post #26 of 35
Sent from my smart phone. Please excuse my brevity
On Feb 19, 2012 4:10 p.m., "Robert Bonomi" <bonomi [at] mail> wrote:
> > From ken.gilmour [at] gmail Sun Feb 19 05:04:39 2012
> > Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 11:59:37 +0100
> > Subject: Re: DNS Attacks
> > From: Ken Gilmour <ken.gilmour [at] gmail>
> > To: Robert Bonomi <bonomi [at] mail>
> > Cc: nanog [at] nanog
> > On Feb 18, 2012 10:24 PM, "Robert Bonomi" <bonomi [at] mail>
> > >
> > > Even better, nat to a 'bogon' DNS server -- one that -- regardless of
> > > query -- returns the address of a dedicated machine on your network
> > > especially for this purpose.
> > What happens when the client sends a POST from a cached page on the end
> > user's machine? E.g. if they post login credentials. Of course, they'll
> > the error page, but then you have confidential data in your logs and now
> > you have to protect highly confidential info, at least if you're in
> *WHAT* 'confidential data' in which logs? <grin>
> The aforementioned dedicated machine isn't a real web-server, or a real
> 'any other' server -- it is solely a special-purpose application machine,
> When you connect to it on say, port 80, it doesn't log anything from the
> port -- it just logs (1) the timestamp, and (2) the connecting IP address
> (and _nothing_ else); then it copies out a previously prepared static
> and disconnects.
> You build a separae app that reads that logfile, matches IP
> to a customer account, and feeds a message into the 'customer records'
> that this customer -has- been notified of this problem, and when, in case
> they call for support.
> If one is 'really' paranoid, the 'logfile' can be implemented as a 'pipe'
> between the processes, so that the data never hits disk in the first
> I've got proof-of-concept code for a single program that handles HTTP
> 80), SMTP (port 25 and port 587), POP3 (port 110), IMAP2 & 4 (port 143),
> (port 220), TELNET (port 23), FTP (port 21), and NNTP (port 119), so far.
> I'm planing to add IRC, and various SSL-based protocols as well.
So you're suggesting that the client sends a DNS request to one of the sink
holes, which is intercepted by an appliance via some sort of NAT and then
dropped? That's also illegal in Europe. You are denying users the right to
Using a redirect to some sort of Web server (a weird sort of DNS poisoning)
will at least inform a user that they're infected. But then that opens
another can of worms. I am imagining some sort of Facebook style "free
notification system" free to what extent? It also trains users to accept
foreign security advice aka fake AV warnings.