jorton at apache
Jul 2, 2009, 6:41 AM
Post #1 of 1
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svn commit: r790587 - in /httpd/httpd/trunk: CHANGES modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
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Author: jorton
Date: Thu Jul 2 13:41:18 2009
New Revision: 790587
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=790587&view=rev
Log:
Security fix for CVE-2009-1890:
* modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c (stream_reqbody_cl): Specify the base
passed to apr_strtoff, and validate the Content-Length in the same
way the HTTP_IN filter does. If the number of bytes streamed
exceeds the expected body length, bail out of the loop.
Submitted by: niq, jorton
Modified:
httpd/httpd/trunk/CHANGES
httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
Modified: httpd/httpd/trunk/CHANGES
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/trunk/CHANGES?rev=790587&r1=790586&r2=790587&view=diff
==============================================================================
--- httpd/httpd/trunk/CHANGES [utf-8] (original)
+++ httpd/httpd/trunk/CHANGES [utf-8] Thu Jul 2 13:41:18 2009
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
Changes with Apache 2.3.3
+ *) SECURITY: CVE-2009-1890 (cve.mitre.org)
+ Fix a potential Denial-of-Service attack against mod_proxy in a
+ reverse proxy configuration, where a remote attacker can force a
+ proxy process to consume CPU time indefinitely. [Nick Kew, Joe Orton]
+
*) SECURITY: CVE-2009-1191 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_proxy_ajp: Avoid delivering content from a previous request which
failed to send a request body. PR 46949 [Ruediger Pluem]
Modified: httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c?rev=790587&r1=790586&r2=790587&view=diff
==============================================================================
--- httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c (original)
+++ httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c Thu Jul 2 13:41:18 2009
@@ -427,10 +427,16 @@
apr_off_t bytes_streamed = 0;
if (old_cl_val) {
+ char *endstr;
+
add_cl(p, bucket_alloc, header_brigade, old_cl_val);
- if (APR_SUCCESS != (status = apr_strtoff(&cl_val, old_cl_val, NULL,
- 0))) {
- return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ status = apr_strtoff(&cl_val, old_cl_val, &endstr, 10);
+
+ if (status || *endstr || endstr == old_cl_val || cl_val < 0) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, status, r,
+ "proxy: could not parse request Content-Length (%s)",
+ old_cl_val);
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
}
terminate_headers(bucket_alloc, header_brigade);
@@ -463,8 +469,13 @@
*
* Prevents HTTP Response Splitting.
*/
- if (bytes_streamed > cl_val)
- continue;
+ if (bytes_streamed > cl_val) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
+ "proxy: read more bytes of request body than expected "
+ "(got %" APR_OFF_T_FMT ", expected %" APR_OFF_T_FMT ")",
+ bytes_streamed, cl_val);
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
if (header_brigade) {
/* we never sent the header brigade, so go ahead and
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